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Political information plays an important role in opinion formation, electoral decision mak-
ing, and ultimately the policies enacted by governments. While some people seek as much political 
news as they can, most individuals vary in terms of the information they acquire. Among other 
factors, this variation can be affected by situations that generate negative emotional states (Albert-
son & Gadarian, 2015; Brader, 2006; Marcus, MacKuen & Neuman, 2000). Affective intelligence 
models suggest that individuals experiencing heightened anxiety or fear will tend toward elevated 
levels of attention and the prioritization of new information, more so than those who enter a mode 
of judgement characterized by enthusiasm (Marcus et al., 2000; see also Brader, 2006) or height-
ened anger/aversion (MacKuen, Wolak, Keele & Marcus, 2010). Scholars have relied on this re-
search, as well as other appraisal theory frameworks, to reach similar conclusions (Carver, 2004; 
Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Abramson & Peterson, 2009; Huddy, Feldman & Cassese, 2007; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks & Davis, 2008). Though political psycholo-
gists have documented exceptions and nuances, there exists a general consensus that fear motivates 
more attentiveness to information, while anger instead prompts individuals to act (Brader, Marcus 
& Miller, 2011). 
While important, the steady stream of discussion regarding differences in political behavior 
conditional on fear versus anger risks taking attention away from the fact that high arousal emotions 
often evoke some greater degree of attentiveness and information seeking (Brader, Marcus, and 
Miller, 2011; Schupp et al., 2004). Especially in information-rich contexts, we argue that it is im-
portant to consider another question: what implications does the relative salience of fear versus 
anger have for the substance of information seeking? We argue that both elevated fear and elevated 





information that is sought. Political psychologists have examined how emotional reactions affect 
information seeking tendencies and whether the search is biased or not (MacKuen et al., 2010; 
Valentino et al., 2008). However, little attention has been given to how emotions intersect with 
threat to affect the types of threat-relevant political information that citizens seek (but see Ryan, 
2012). To advance theory and research on this topic, we focus on responses to terrorist threat—a 
particularly salient context in recent times and one associated with a number of negative emotions, 
including both anxiety/fear and anger/aversion. 
 We draw on conceptualizations of the tendencies associated with fear and anger to argue 
that, in a condition of threat, individuals for whom one emotional state is elevated to a greater 
degree than another can be similarly inclined to seek out information and, yet, they will differ in 
the type of information they privilege. Fear is typically experienced when an individual perceives 
a situation as uncertain and is often accompanied by an inclination to engage in defensive behavior. 
As such, individuals experiencing relatively higher levels of anxiety/fear in relation to terrorism 
should be more likely to search for protection-oriented information (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; see 
also discussions in Albertson & Gadarian, 2015 and Stein, 2013). On the contrary, anger is elevated 
when individuals assign a high likelihood to a negative outcome caused by a specific external actor; 
in such circumstances, individuals are more inclined toward riskier and punitive actions (Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). Thus, to the degree that anger is comparatively more salient in individuals’ reac-
tions to terrorist threat, they ought to be more motivated toward information on aggressive re-
sponses.  
We assess these expectations in a U.S.-based study in which research participants were 





news of terrorist threat. To test our core hypothesis about the comparative salience of fear vs. anger, 
those in the threat condition were further assigned at random to an emotion induction task meant 
to elicit feelings associated with either the former, or the latter. Participants then engaged in infor-
mation seeking for a hypothetical election within a dynamic processing tracing environment, which 
provides a behavioral measure of information seeking. 
Theoretical Perspectives on Threat, Emotions, and Information Acquisition 
Scholars generally agree that varying emotional states shape differential reactions to 
threats. While individuals tend to experience different emotions simultaneously (Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988, Abelson, Kinder, Peters & Fiske, 1982), one (or one set of) emotion(s) can be 
comparatively more elevated and thus take a predominant role in influencing subsequent apprais-
als, attitudes, and behavior. Some early studies on the role of emotions in public opinion focused 
on positive (enthusiastic) versus negative (threatening/anxiety-producing) states (Marcus & MacK-
uen, 1993; Marcus et al., 2000), and argued that the latter cause individuals to seek out more infor-
mation and to rely less on prior beliefs when expressing preferences. More recently, political psy-
chologists have begun to explore how distinct negative emotional reactions shape information 
seeking and policy preferences (e.g., Banks & Hicks, 2015; Huddy et al., 2007; MacKuen et al., 
2010; Ryan, 2012; Valentino et al., 2008). 
Much of this research draws on, and/or represents variations on, appraisal theories of emo-
tion, which propose that different perceived emotions emerge from and are related to different 
appraisals (evaluations) and action (behavioral) tendencies (see discussions in Frijda, 1987; Laza-
rus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), and may therefore be associated 





emerge from appraising a stimulus as unpleasant, fear tends to be relatively more salient when a 
situation is uncertain. In contrast, anger tends to be elevated in situations with clear consequences 
that are attributable to a specific source (Carver, 2004; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Harmon-Jones 
et al., 2009; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Moreover, while anger is more 
commonly associated with individuals believing that they are in control and prepared to act (Mar-
cus et al., 2000), fear tends to be associated with the opposite evaluation (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; 
Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischhoff, 2003). Fear is thus associated with an individual’s prepara-
tion to engage in defensive behavior, while anger is associated with preparation to confront the 
source of the threat (Frijda, 1987; Hall, 2011; Marcus et al., 2000; Steimer, 2002; Valentino, 
Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz & Hutchings, 2011).  
Collectively, appraisal theory frameworks inform expectations regarding how individuals 
will respond to threatening conditions. Angry individuals, as opposed to fearful individuals, are 
more prone to act, to rely on heuristic-based processing of information, to place blame on specific 
actors (Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards, 1993; Small, Lerner & Fischhoff, 2006), to exhibit higher 
out-group animosity, and to support more risky and vengeful policies (Bang Petersen, 2010; Huddy 
et al., 2007; Lerner, Goldberg & Tetlock, 1998; Lerner et al., 2003). Not only has this line of 
research offered numerous important findings, it also provides a foundation for deriving expecta-
tions about how the substance of information acquisition behavior is shaped by the relative salience 
of particular emotions. 
Emotional Reactions to Politics and Information Seeking Under Threat 
Conditions of terror threat provide an appropriate test case for examining the intersection 





generate a diverse set of negative emotions, including fear and anger (Merolla & Zechmeister, 
2009; Hall & Ross, 2015). It makes sense that individuals would react with fear/anxiety, as the 
varying of targets, times, and methods increases worry about the possibility of another attack, at 
any time, any place. Individuals may also react with anger, given that terrorist attacks are deliberate 
acts often by specific individuals and groups. Conditional on the way an attack is framed by leaders 
or the media, one of these emotions may end up relatively more dominant than the other (Hall & 
Ross, 2015). This diversity in reactions is important. While there is consensus in the literature that 
individuals in high arousal and negative emotional states are more likely to pay attention to threat-
ening stimuli (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Marcus et al., 2000; Schupp et al., 2004), there is less 
consensus regarding whether information seeking varies with the degree to which one negative 
emotion is comparatively more elevated than another. There is even less consideration of the types 
of information individuals may prioritize depending on their emotional state. 
One strand of what has become, for some, conventional wisdom puts a spotlight on anxiety 
as a powerful motivator of information acquisition. Drawing from a variety of appraisal theories, 
some evidence in political science supports the hypothesis that individuals experiencing fear in 
relation to a political threat are comparatively more likely to seek out information than are individ-
uals experiencing anger (MacKuen et al., 2010). For example, Huddy et al. (2007) found that fear 
about the war in Iraq had a significantly stronger positive effect than anger on citizens’ levels of 
thinking about the war. In an experimental study, Valentino et al. (2008) found that even though 
induced fear and anger (evoked in response to a political campaign) increased self-reported atten-
tion, fear had the strongest and most consistent effect. In addition, individuals induced to feel anger 





Yet, other research suggests that anger can stimulate information searches (Hansen & Han-
sen, 1988; Huddy et al., 2007; Tavris, 1989), and this may be more likely in circumstances when 
costs are low (Ryan, 2012) and when there are limited opportunities for other types of action. For 
example, if an angry individual is in an information-rich environment such as social media, she 
may choose to act by engaging in information seeking. Some scholarship provides support for this 
perspective: Ryan (2012) found that an anger-inducing advertisement was more effective in moti-
vating information seeking online than a fear-inducing advertisement.   
In short, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect both fear and anger to promote 
information seeking in response to a threat, particularly in contexts in which the most accessible 
action available is seeking information (e.g., social media-saturated environments). Much of the 
scholarship to date focuses on the sheer tendency toward or amount of information seeking, as well 
as whether individuals engage in biased information seeking. If we turn to the content of infor-
mation seeking, we first expect that individuals experiencing negative emotions will be more in-
clined to search for threat-relevant information (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). That is, they will 
focus on information linked to the source of their emotional experience. In the context of our study, 
this would be information about terrorism. We consider this hypothesis in the analysis below: under 
threat, elevated fear and anger both can motivate terrorism-relevant information seeking (H1).  
Further, since individuals tend to perceive new stimuli in a manner consistent with the ap-
praisals linked to their specific emotional state (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001), we also expect that 
they will focus on threat-relevant information that is consistent with these appraisals. Seeking out 
information that is consistent with a particular emotional appraisal may also aid in attaining one’s 





Given that perceived anger arises with appraisals of certainty and control (Lerner & Kelt-
ner, 2000; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and an inclination to fight against the source of the threat 
(Frijda, 1987; Marcus et al., 2000), we posit Hypothesis 2a: angry individuals will be more likely 
to search for information relating to aggression-oriented policy responses to the threat (H2a). This 
would help to fulfill goals pertinent to retributive-action. Meanwhile, since fear is associated with 
uncertainty, lower levels of control (Huddy et al., 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), 
and a behavioral tendency to engage in defensive behavior (Frijda, 1987; Marcus et al., 2000; 
Steimer, 2002), we establish Hypothesis 2b: fearful individuals will search for information related 
to defensive policy responses to the threat (H2b). These expectations are similar to those developed 
in Ryan (2012) and Nabi (2003), though the focus in our work is most similar to Ryan’s with 
respect to the contention that emotions serve motivational, as opposed to framing, roles. A differ-
ence in our theoretical framework is that our expectations hold for information that is relevant to 
the threat, which is not a distinction drawn in Ryan (2012). That is, we would not expect individuals 
to prioritize anger/fear-consistent information about an unrelated topic, only anger/fear-consistent 
information that is threat-relevant.  
A limited number of studies have examined similar hypotheses. In a study of reactions to 
drunk driving, Nabi (2003) found that angry individuals were more likely to seek information on 
retribution-related policies on the issue of drunk driving, while fearful individuals were more likely 
to look for information on protection-oriented policies (for similar frameworks, see also the dis-
cussions in Eckhardt & Cohen, 1997; Smith & Waterman, 2003). However, the same results did 
not hold for the issue of gun violence. Ryan (2012) did not find a difference in information seeking 





retribution-oriented and matched the relevant emotion. One limitation in Nabi’s study is that the 
measure was based on a self-report and there was not information unrelated to the issue available 
as an option. In Ryan’s study, the retribution information condition was mild and only linked to 
“winning” the election, which some may not clearly see as related to retribution. With so few em-
pirical studies to draw on, it remains an open question whether or not these expectations are (or are 
not) borne out in general and, for our purposes, with respect to terror threat. 
Experimental Design and Sample 
Our data are drawn from a multi-investigator, multi-site dynamic processing-tracing envi-
ronment (DPTE; see https://dpte.polisci.uiowa.edu/dpte/) experiment, which allows us to compare 
the content of information seeking under conditions of terrorist threat compared to times of relative 
well-being. The data come from 303 volunteer participants residing in communities surrounding 
three major research universities (102 from California, 98 from New Jersey, and 103 from Tennes-
see; the IRBs at each institution reviewed and approved the study). These participants were re-
cruited using a variety of methods to alert the local (non-student) community of the opportunity to 
enroll in a “computer-based study about electoral decision-making” at the university. The recruit-
ment text indicated that individuals did not need to be familiar with computers, have a college 
education, or any interest in politics. Recruitment notices were sent to community organizations, 
emails to community listservs, and community bulletin boards. Interested individuals contacted a 
research assistant and set up an appointment. The recruitment and study ran during April and May 
of 2011.2 Our sample is in no way representative of the U.S. population; the only criteria for par-
ticipation were that the subject was a U.S. citizen, able to read English, had access to the internet, 





diagnostic assessments, we found no evidence that the treatment groups were unbalanced by these 
characteristics). At the time of our study, the DPTE software was best used in a lab, compared to 
an online setting, in case there were glitches in the program.  
As an orientation, subjects were told that they would be participating in a “simulated” pres-
idential campaign with candidates who were fictional but realistic—“that is, very much like the 
type of people who usually run for president.” They were told that there would be more information 
available than it is possible to fully track, as in any campaign, and asked to “do the best you can 
deciding which candidate you want to support.” Subjects were also informed that they could with-
draw from the study at any time; upon completing the study, participants were debriefed and com-
pensated $30.  
To the degree possible, the setup of the experiment mirrored an actual election in which 
citizens are asked to consider and decide on candidates in a campaign without any additional in-
ducement or reward for making a quality decision. As with campaigns, information presented in 
the study was designed to motivate engagement in the following ways: a) a dynamic and interactive 
environment that allowed individuals to access candidate information and poll information; b) clear 
instructions at the start of the study that the goal of the process, for the participants (voters), is to 
evaluate candidates and make a decision.  
Subjects began the study by answering a pre-treatment questionnaire that included a stand-
ard set of questions on socio-demographics, political attitudes, and political knowledge. Next, sub-
jects completed a 2-minute practice session in order to gain familiarity with the DPTE software, 
which places them into a context of a two-stage mock election (primary and general). Participants 





a control group, a terrorism group, or a “good times” group. Those in the terrorism and good times 
groups were exposed to mock news stories delivered as audiovisual presentations, (see Online Ap-
pendix B for the scripts). We modeled the audiovisual presentations after media clips commonly 
seen on news websites, which combine images with voiceover. These presentations were compiled 
by a professional video editor, narrated by a professional voice actor, and recorded in a university 
sound studio.  
The terrorism treatment was designed to elevate concerns about terrorism relative to the 
control and good times conditions. We modeled the treatment after the types of mock news stories 
that have been validated by use in past research (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Merolla & 
Zechmeister, 2009). The terror threat article discussed past attacks by Al Qaeda and the potential 
for future attacks.3 The good times treatment contained positive information about the country; it 
sought to induce subjects to not think about pending national threats. This condition, therefore, 
serves as another type of baseline, a more positive informational state, which is consistent with the 
approach often used in framing research (see Druckman, 2001) and in research on threat (Merolla 
& Zechmeister, 2009). Since these types of threat treatments have been shown to increase both 
anger and fear in past work (Merolla & Zechmeister 2009, 2018), we would expect to find that 
exposure to the terrorism conditions makes individuals more likely to search for terrorism-relevant 
information (H1).  
After making terrorism more salient in the minds of participants, we then wanted to make 
either fear or anger more salient to a subset of respondents in the terrorism conditions, to assess the 
relative effects of elevated anger versus fear (H2). Subjects in the terror threat conditions were 





interest in affective responses to terrorist threat, we used a repeated “feel” prompt to solicit their 
feelings. The instruction was: 
 “We’d like to ask you to think a bit more about the threat posed by terrorism. In what 
ways does the terrorist threat make you feel [anger prompt: angry, hostile, or dis-
gusted/fear prompt: afraid, nervous or scared]? Please write down a few sentences that 
explain why the terrorist threat makes you feel [angry, hostile, or disgusted/afraid, 
nervous, or scared."  
This approach to experimentally manipulating emotions is common in social psychology 
research (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), and has been successfully applied to 
the study of emotions in political contexts (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Banks & Hicks, 2015; 
Lerner et al., 2003; Valentino et al., 2008, 2011).4 While individuals may still feel anger-related 
emotions in the fear condition and vice versa, the goal of these inductions was to make one of the 
negative emotions comparatively more salient. The terror only condition, which did not do an in-
duction, represents a group that experiences a mix of negative emotions; scholars have documented 
that news about terrorist threat elevates a range of negative emotions, including anger and fear, in 
the lab and at large (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009, 2018; Hall & Ross, 2015).  
In sum, we randomly assigned subjects to five conditions: good times, terror only (no emo-
tion induction), terror-anger, terror-fear, and a control group. To test H1, we compare conditions 
in which individuals were exposed to either a terrorism news-story, or that plus an emotions induc-
tion test (see below), vs. the good times or control conditions. To test H2a and H2b, we test each 
particular emotion induction condition (anger, fear) against all other conditions. Note that the 





induction; since both groups were exposed to the same terrorism news story prior to that induction, 
we effectively hold all else equal, except the nudge we give to one group toward anger-related 
emotions and the other toward fear-related emotions. Further, we note that all treated conditions 
were designed to elicit cognitive evaluations (e.g., awareness of threat or a more positive assess-
ment of current times) and emotional arousal (negative emotions such as anger and fear, or a set of 
positive emotions). While other designs (e.g., mere emotion induction) may have their own bene-
fits, integrating news stories into the design increases external validity, in that it mirrors mecha-
nisms by which individuals experience politically-relevant threat and related emotions.  
 Following the treatment, participants in both primaries (individuals “registered” to vote in 
the Democratic or Republican primary) were presented with a screen providing the names and 
pictures of six fictitious candidates. This slate is smaller than the menu of 17 who entered into the 
Republican presidential primary in the 2016 election, equal to the 6 that entered the 2016 Demo-
cratic presidential primary, and more than the 2 who effectively contested the latter. At that time, 
the DPTE was initialized and individuals began to view information. We restrict our attention to 
the primary since our treatments were administered prior to the primary election. 
In contrast to the static approach of measuring information seeking, the DPTE exposes par-
ticipants to a column of information that moves down the screen continuously. The participant has 
the option to click on a particular piece of information to learn more about the topic. For example, 
if an item with the title “Candidate A’s Religion” moves down the screen, and the participant de-
cides to click on it, she will be provided with information regarding Candidate A’s religious affil-





there is a tradeoff: selecting one piece of information to view may mean that another piece of 
information is no longer available.  
The order of the information was randomized. There were 18 themes for which individuals 
could read about the stances of a given candidate, and these ranged from topics such as terrorism, 
to education, to global warming. Participants could also search for other types of information about 
the candidates, including their education, family, military experience, and work prior to politics. 
Finally, participants could search for the endorsement of a number of liberal and conservative or-
ganizations. This process gives us a behavioral measure of the information accessed by partici-
pants. While many studies have relied solely on self-reports of attention or interest in information 
(e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2000; Nabi, 2003), studies are increasingly turning to be-
havioral measures (e.g., MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2008; Ryan, 2012). 
As with all experiments, it is crucial to address differences between the lab setting and the 
everyday world. For one, we use fictional candidates, but they have biographies and issue stances 
that are commonly seen in everyday political environments. Another feature of the DPTE is that 
there are fewer distractors and fewer options for action available to subjects in the lab. In this way, 
the design is closest to those cases in which individuals are operating in an information-rich envi-
ronment with low-costs. From our perspective, it is this type of environment that may be most 
amenable to finding increased tendencies toward information seeking among those induced to ex-
perience a high arousal emotion, such as fear or anger.  
Manipulation check 
To assess the extent to which our emotion inductions were successful in elevating compar-





code the open-ended responses provided by individuals in the fear or anger treatments. Specifi-
cally, the assistant coded for 1) whether the respondent articulated the correct emotion (fear or 
anger), 2) the identity of the “target” of the respondent’s emotional response (e.g., terrorism, the 
US government, human capacity for evil, etc.) and 3) the primary aspect of terrorism that elicited 
the emotional response (e.g., the threat to the respondent, threat to others, etc.). The results of this 
open-ended analysis show that about 45.9% of those in the anger condition gave responses that 
reflected anger, while 49.2% of those in the fear condition gave responses the reflected fear. Among 
those who reflected on the emotion in the treatment, we see some meaningful differences emerge 
between those in the fear and anger conditions. In coding the target of their fear/anger, individuals 
in the fear condition directed their fear primarily toward terrorism (97%), while this target was 
lower among those in the anger condition (75%). A non-trivial percentage of those in the anger 
condition were also likely to mention anger at the U.S. government (14%, see appendix Table C.1). 
In our coding of the primary aspect of terrorism that elicited an emotional response, the modal 
aspect of terrorism that made respondents feel fear was personal threat (32%), while the modal 
aspect of terrorism that made respondents feel anger was threat to others (52%, see appendix Table 
C.1). 
To develop a more fine-grained measure of the extent to which anger and fear were ele-
vated in the emotion induction conditions,5 we invited 60 MTurk Master workers to complete a 
task in which they coded 10 statements submitted by subjects who had completed the emotion 
induction task. For each statement, they scored (on a 10-point scale) the extent to which the text 
expressed the set of emotions subjects had been asked to express in the task, as well as the set of 





Each of the statements in the study received 5 different assessments and we averaged over these 
multiple assessments to estimate the expressed level of emotion for each statement. For those in 
the anger condition, the mean on the angry/hostile/disgusted measure is 4.9, while the mean for 
this group on the afraid/nervous/scared measure is 3.0 (this difference is statistically significant at 
p<.001). For those in the fear condition, the mean on the afraid/nervous/scared measure is 4.6, 
while the mean for this group on the angry/hostile/disgusted measure is 1.4 (difference significant 
at p<.001). The averaged induced emotion scores on this measure for each treatment, 4.9 in anger 
and 4.6 in fear, are statistically indistinguishable from each other (p=0.49, two-tailed); therefore, 
the treatments were of similar strength in inducing the given emotion. In short, the treatments 
were successful in elevating expressions of anger in the anger induction and fear in the fear in-
duction, and they did so to a similar degree, that is at a moderate level, which seems reasonable 
given the nature of the study. 
The data demonstrate heterogeneity in individuals’ inclinations to feel certain emotions 
when presented with the induction task. For example, some individuals asked to reflect on fears 
about terrorism simply report that they do not have any. Some individuals asked to reflect on anger 
state they only feel it to a moderate extent. To the degree that is the case, one can argue that intent-
to-treat (ITT) results better reflect what we would observe if the subjects in this study were exposed 
to terrorist threat in a real-world situation. In the findings section, we therefore focus on ITT effects. 
However, to take into account that the induction was only successful in elevating fear or anger 
among some respondents, and for the sake of completeness, we also calculate complier average 





Rubin (2015). For these analyses, we use the more fine-grained measures of compliance generated 
based on ratings from the MTurk Master workers.6 
Measures 
Prior to assessing hypotheses, we must operationalize information seeking in the context of 
the DPTE experiment. Our interest is in whether subjects choose to read (and thus click on) differ-
ent types of threat-relevant information. As such, we capture information seeking by measuring the 
proportion of clicks associated with a particular type of information. There are four types of infor-
mation directly relevant to security threats: each candidate’s 1) position on terrorism policy, 2) 
position on military intervention, 3) position on the defense budget, and 4) level of military expe-
rience. We consider these first in combination (H1) and then treat a subset separately (H2).  
 An important feature of measuring information seeking in the context of the DPTE study 
is that, if given enough time, individuals could have viewed virtually all of the information pro-
vided in the primary election. Our assumption is that subjects will prioritize the more important 
information by seeking it out first. Therefore, we focus attention on the proportion of the first 5 
and 10 clicks devoted to security-related information (i.e., terrorism policy, military intervention, 
defense budget, and military experience) versus all other information items in the main text and 
report robustness checks using 2 to 10 clicks in section D of the appendix.7 
Results I: Combined Measure of Security-Related Information 
We first turn to an analysis of the proportion of clicks associated with combining all of the 
security information items. Based on past scholarship on political threat, we expect that the pro-
portion of clicks for all of the security-related items will be higher among those in the terror threat 





in assessing whether the type of information acquired depends on the subject’s emotional state 
(H2a and H2b). We examine each of these expectations in turn. 
Figure 1 shows the ITT estimate for the mean difference in the proportion of clicks across 
experimental conditions for all security-related items through the first 5 and 10 clicks. Turning to 
the first 5 clicks, as demonstrated in the figure, subjects who were exposed to the threat-only treat-
ment searched, on average, for more information on security-related items than subjects in the good 
times condition (ITT = 0.046, p = 0.039).8 When comparing to the good times condition, we observe 
even larger differences for the terror-anger condition (ITT = .077, p = 0.002; CATE=0.164, 
p=0.002), while we fail to detect differences for the terror-fear treatment.9 On average, individuals 
in the terror-anger condition are also more likely than respondents in the terror-fear condition to 
click on security-related information in the first 5 clicks (ITT = .052, p = 0.056; CATE=0.113, 
p=0.044). And while subjects in the terror-anger condition have a higher propensity to seek out 
security-relevant information (on average) relative to those in the threat-only condition, the differ-
ence is insignificant at traditional levels.10 We do not find significant differences between any of 
the threat conditions and the control group.11  
Thus, for two out of the three terror threat conditions, we find some support for the expec-
tation (H1) that individuals feeling threatened are more likely to access security-related infor-
mation, at least when compared to subjects who were actively treated not to think about any pend-
ing threats (good times). The null findings for the terror-fear condition are somewhat surprising 
given prior work on anxiety leading to increased information seeking, where the effects of anxiety 





linked to our contention that individuals induced to feel comparatively more fearful or angry about 
the threat of terrorism will tend to seek out different types of security-relevant information. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 By the time participants reach their 10th click, substantive differences across the experi-
mental conditions begin to diminish. There are two exceptions to this rule: individuals in the terror-
anger condition are more likely to seek out security-related information when compared to the 
good times (ITT = 0.042, p = 0.025; CATE = 0.084, p = 0.013) and terror-fear (ITT = 0.031, p = 
0.086; CATE = 0.063, p = 0.070) conditions. Nevertheless, it is notable that the extent to which 
these treatments have effects in this environment, they decay rather quickly. 
 The overarching argument assessed above is that individuals exposed to a context of terror 
threat will seek out threat-relevant information. To further assess this thesis, we conduct a series 
of placebo tests. If our argument is correct, we should not see increases in attention to information 
across experimental conditions for non-threat relevant information. We thus examined whether the 
treatments had an effect on increasing clicks for issues unrelated to security: namely, information 
about the candidates’ positions on abortion, affirmative action policy, economic philosophy, edu-
cation policy, energy policy, health policy, jobs policy, and welfare policy. As can be seen in Figure 
2, we find no evidence that those in the threat conditions, compared to the control or good times, 
are more likely to seek out information on these non-threat-relevant topics.12 In brief, subjects in 
the threat conditions tend to seek out only more threat-relevant information, lending more confi-
dence in our conclusion that individuals exposed to threatening conditions are more likely to seek 
out information directly related to the threat (H1). 





Results II: Individual Measures of Security-Related Information 
We now turn to analyses that separate the different types of security-related information 
available in the study to test the expectations that angry individuals will be more prone to pay 
attention to militant, action-oriented information on the threat (H2a), while fearful individuals will 
be more prone to pay attention to defense- and protection-related information (H2b). Recall that 
these expectations are derived from the tendencies associated with each emotion; past research has 
connected anger to preferences for vengeful policy (Huddy et al., 2007) and fear (anxiety) with 
preferences for protective policy (e.g., Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Nabi, 2003). We restrict our 
focus to the measure based on the first 5 clicks and to the security items that most closely connect 
to our hypotheses. The military intervention item most clearly falls into the category of an action-
oriented and aggressive policy that may appeal to those made angry about terrorism. The item that 
most closely approximates defense-oriented information—and thus may appeal to those made fear-
ful about terrorism—is the defense spending item. This item is not ideal, since individuals may 
also think of defense spending as being used for aggressive policies, but it is the closest option 
available.13  Military experience and terrorism policy do not neatly fall into a more defensive or 
more militant type, so we do not analyze these items individually in the main text but do so in the 
appendix (see Figure F.1 for those results).  
In order to assess our assumptions about the extent to which these items reflect more 
aggressive or more protective-oriented information, we recruited 100 Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
workers to do a classification task. After describing the purpose of the task and completing a train-
ing question, participants classified the four military intervention items—the candidate’s stance on 





into whether the item is more appropriate for protecting against terrorism or fighting terrorism. 
Specifically, subjects were required to “drag and drop” each policy item to a box labeled “Protect-
ing against terrorism” or “Fighting against terrorism” (see appendix Figure E.1 for an example of 
the question format). The position of the labels and the order of the policy items were randomized 
across participants.  
The results of this exercise provide clear support for our characterization of aggressive and 
defense-oriented information items. The military intervention item was most often classified as 
relevant for “fighting against terrorism” (80%), followed by the candidate’s military experience 
(69%), their stance on terrorism policy (33%), and lastly their stance on defense policy (31%). 
Conversely, the defense budget item was classified as relevant for “protecting against terrorism” 
69% of the time. In general, the results of this classification task line up well with our assumptions, 
though as expected the percentage is somewhat lower for the defense policy item.  
Figure 3 provides the ITT estimate for the proportion of the first 5 clicks devoted to each 
of the separate, security-related information items. When looking at the military intervention items, 
we find that subjects in the terror-anger condition tend to be more likely to search for this infor-
mation compared to other groups. Considering, first, the difference between those who read the 
terror news story and differ only to the extent that they were assigned to either the anger or fear 
induction, subjects in the terror-anger condition are more likely than those in the terror-fear con-
dition (ITT = 0.033, p = 0.094; CATE = 0.066, p = 0.054) to click on the military intervention 
items (on average). We also see that subjects in the terror-anger condition are more likely than 
individuals in the control group (ITT = 0.036, p = 0.037; CATE = 0.073, p = 0.035) and the good 





intervention items (on average).14 Further, though mean propensity to view the military interven-
tion items was higher in the terror-anger condition relative to the terror-only condition, the differ-
ence is outside of traditional significance levels (p=0.196).15 These findings provide support for 
H2a in that the terror-anger condition is significantly different from the terror-fear condition and, 
as well, the two baseline conditions of a non-threat (the control and good times). We do not observe 
significant differences between terror and terror-fear and the control or good times conditions. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 Lastly, Figure 3 presents the proportion of clicks across each of the treatment conditions 
for the defense budget item. When examining the defense budget item, we find that subjects in the 
terror-fear condition are more likely to search for information related to the defense budget, when 
compared to subjects in the terror-anger condition (ITT = 0.023, p = 0.065; CATE = 0.046, p = 
0.034). This finding is consistent with our expectation (H2b). However, all other differences for 
the defense budget item are weak and statistically insignificant. Therefore, we find modest support 
for H2b.16 While conventional wisdom and previous evidence hold that fear and anxiety are dom-
inant drivers of information seeking tendencies under times of threat, the evidence from our study 
supports a more nuanced interpretation. Specifically, the findings suggests that, under conditions 
of terrorist threat in which multiple types of information are available to individuals (especially 
information consistent with appraisal tendencies for those feeling anger), and costs are low, a par-
ticular effect of elevated fear may be attenuated as a driver of information seeking behavior, in 






How individuals react to national security threats, and specifically whether they react with 
comparatively more fear or anger, has significant consequences for information seeking. The types 
of information individuals tune into can have implications for the formation of political attitudes 
and decision-making (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000). Yet, previous scholarship 
has focused mostly on general differences between emotional responses and, within the field of 
research on threats, a dominant perspective has evolved around the notion that anxiety is more 
effective in motivating information seeking than anger. We believe that such a conclusion over-
looks theoretical and empirical reasons to suspect that anger can also motivate information seeking, 
conditional on the nature of the environment in which the threat is presented. 
Our research advances understandings of how threats may evoke emotions that in turn in-
fluence information orientations among the public. The findings from the DPTE study show quite 
clearly that individuals exposed to a condition of terror threat are more likely to attend to threat-
relevant information (as compared to the good times group). We find very few significant differ-
ences between the baseline conditions and the threat conditions for non-threat information. These 
findings dovetail nicely with work by Albertson & Gadarian (2015), who find that individuals 
made anxious (about immigration) are more attuned to threat-relevant information.  
Our study goes beyond this, however, in considering the intersection of threat, emotions 
(fear versus anger), and types of threat-relevant information seeking. More specifically, our study 
shows how outcomes can vary when different types of security-relevant information are available. 
We found that those made angry about terrorism were more likely to search for an aggregated 
measure of security-relevant items than those made fearful about terrorism. Part of this may have 





contained more aggressive approaches to the threat of international terrorism. This intuition is sup-
ported in our second set of analyses where we isolated the effects of two types of information items: 
one that should be more appealing to those angry about terrorism, military intervention, and one 
more appealing to those fearful about terrorism, defense spending. Here, we find that individuals 
made angry about terrorism are more likely to click on the military intervention item in the first 
five clicks, while those made fearful are more likely to click on defense spending. That these effects 
are ephemeral in the lab setting makes sense, as the terrorism news treatment is itself fleeting; our 
supposition is that the endurance of the influence of threat and emotions on information seeking is 
conditional on the duration and salience of the threat, and the corresponding emotions it generates. 
Nonetheless, the key finding here is that elevated anger and fear can motivate orientations toward 
different types of information, which is consistent with and extends beyond a small set of prior 
research into this question (e.g., Nabi, 2003). The extent to which a threat arouses fear or anger to 
a greater degree affects information seeking outcomes, and the balance of information available 
also will shape the extent to which fearful or angry individuals show a propensity to access infor-
mation.  
We conclude by noting that the argument and analyses presented here have relevance be-
yond a contribution to academic scholarship. Our contention is that threats to national security, and 
the fear and anger they elicit, have important effects on public opinion. Threats, like that posed by 
international terrorism, can cause people to pause and pay attention to politics. Within such a con-
text, the extent to which the media, politicians’ rhetoric, or other factors make one emotion com-
paratively more salient than the other has important consequences for the types of information that 
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Figure 1: All Security-Related Items, Intent-to-Treat (ITT) Estimates. Dots equal the mean 
difference in the proportion devoted to all security-related issues included in the DPTE study 
through the first 5 and 10 “clicks,” respectively. Security-related items include positions terrorism 
policy, military intervention, defense spending, and military expenditures. The (grey) lines indicate 







Figure 2: Placebo Tests, Intent-to-Treat (ITT) Estimates (above figure). This figure presents the mean 
difference for 8 non-military (or “placebo”) issues. The grey lines represent 90% confidence intervals. As 













Figure 3: Security-Related Items by Type, Intent-to-Treat (ITT) Estimates. Dots equal the 
mean in the proportion devoted to two key security-related policy areas through the first 5 “clicks.” 








1 Marcus et al. (2000) propose that distinct pre-conscious appraisals cause citizens to enter three 
distinct “modes of judgment”, while other appraisal theories differ in that they focus on how emo-
tions are expressed, considered, and influential within a conscious cognitive state. Our objective is 
not to adjudicate between varying appraisal theory frameworks but, instead, we draw on the general 
lessons provided by appraisal theory frameworks to derive a set of expectations about the relevance 
of the comparative elevation of fear versus anger. 
2 We note that in the middle of this period, on May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed in a raid 
on his hideout. As with any salient news related to terrorism, this event could have pre-treated all 
subjects with greater (or lessened) concern about terrorist threat, and potentially – at least in this 
case - higher levels of anger. Unfortunately, the software used for data collection did not track the 
study date, so we cannot explore if responses differed before and after this event. However, we 
were able to look at whether Osama bin Laden was referenced in the open-ended responses in the 
emotion induction conditions and we do not find any references. Furthermore, if respondents were 
pre-treated with higher anger, we might expect to find higher anger among those in the fear induc-
tion condition, but instead expressions of anger are quite low for this group (see details in the 
manipulation check section). 
3 The treatment is focused on the threat of attacks by groups who are unambiguously associated 
with carrying out lethal attacks and planning to conduct future attacks. The treatment refers several 
times to Al Qaeda’s past attacks and expressed plans for the future. The news stories did not men-
tion religion or ethnic identities, yet one could ask whether some readers perceive news about vio-
lent plots and attacks by Al Qaeda and similar groups as political spin to build support for anti-





                                                                                                                                                        
Muslim policies; if this is the case, they may have reacted against the treatment. We do not find 
that this is the case (see also Online Appendix B.4).   
4 When we designed and fielded our study, we debated which terms to include in our induction 
task, since the word or words used tend to vary across studies. To pick the terms, we relied on a 
combination of terms used in induction tasks in prior work, as well as survey batteries to capture 
anger and fear. To induce fear, we used afraid, which has been used in a number of induction tasks 
(e.g., Lerner et al. 2003; Valentino et al. 2008; 2011), as well as nervous and scared, which has 
been included in survey based batteries to capture the concept (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Nabi 
2003). To induce anger, we used anger, which has been used in a number of induction tasks (e.g., 
Lerner et al. 2003; Valentino et al. 2008; 2011), as well as disgusted, which has been included in 
survey batteries to capture anger/aversion (e.g., Marcus et al. 2006; Nabi 2003). We recognize that 
scholars draw a distinction between disgust and anger, with disgust being motivated by a desire to 
avoid pathogens and contamination and anger being approach-oriented (e.g., Aarøe et al. 2017; 
Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009; Kam and Estes 2016; Tybur et al. 2012). While anger and disgust 
may be theoretically distinct, lay understandings of the term disgust map more closely to anger 
(Nabi 2002). In fact, if we look at direct mention of disgust in reaction to our anger induction, all 
of the responses link to anger-related themes. Another concern (raised by an anonymous reviewer) 
is that hostile may be interpreted more as an action rather than a feeling. We therefore carefully 
examined the open-ended responses to the anger induction for mentions of hostile and found that 
participants connected the term to feelings and anger-related themes. 





                                                                                                                                                        
6 If we use the more blunt dichotomous measures from the coding by our research assistant, our 
conclusions are unchanged. We recognize that calculating the CATE is primarily used to take into 
account whether participants comply with the treatment. In the context of our study, individuals 
might still comply with the treatment but not experience the induced emotion. Therefore, the CATE 
used here can be thought of as the effect among those who are more likely to have expressed the 
emotion we asked them to reflect on. 
7Note that all participants first clicked on a synopsis page that included the candidate pictures and 
names. When deciding on the threshold number of clicks to use for this analysis, our goal is to 
construct a measure sensitive enough to gauge the information prioritized by participants. Given 
the structure of the DPTE environment, setting the threshold too high makes it difficult to discern 
which information is the most salient; setting the threshold too low implies that participants will 
only see a small, random subset of the available information. In light of these considerations and 
based on our experience observing the level of information available at different points in the sys-
tem, we determined that between roughly 5 and 10 clicks offers a suitable balance between these 
two extremes. Nevertheless, to assess the robustness of our findings to alternative assumptions, 
Tables D.1, D.2, and D.3 in the online appendix replicate our main analysis using alternative thresh-
old values (ranging from 2 to 10). The results are quite robust. The reported relationships tend to 
be weaker for low threshold values (2 clicks), as these measures are noisy and heavily influenced 
by the random starting position assigned by the DPTE environment. However, after about 3 clicks, 
the results are similar to those presented for 5 and 10 clicks in Figure 1. 





                                                                                                                                                        
9It is important to note that when comparing good times to the threat conditions we cannot be 
entirely clear which manipulation is leading to the observed differences. While the terror-only and 
terror-anger conditions tend to search for more security-related information when compared with 
the control group, neither difference is significantly different from zero. On the other hand, differ-
ences between the control group and good times condition are significant at the 10% error level 
(ITT = 0.044, p= 0.082). 
10 Some of this may be due to anger being high in the threat-only condition. Recent work on ter-
rorism and public opinion finds that the threat is more likely to elevate anger than fear (Fisk, Mer-
olla & Ramos, 2018; Wayne, 2018). 
11The difference between terror-anger and the control group is in the expected direction, but not 
significant by conventional standards (p = 0.19, two-tailed). 
12 We do instead find a few cases of individuals in the threat conditions being less likely to search 
for non-threat-relevant information (in particular on the issue of education). We also find one sig-
nificant difference in information seeking on non-threat-relevant information between the terror-
fear and terror only conditions. 
13 Since this was a multi-investigator study, we only had the opportunity to introduce manipulations 
before the DPTE environment, and did not have a say in exactly what information was available in 
that environment. 
14 One limitation to these comparisons (as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer) is that there are 
several things that are different between the conditions, in that the anger condition not only did an 
induction, but also watched an audiovisual report about terrorism, so a mixture of cognition and 





                                                                                                                                                        
effects for the terror condition that had participants watch the audiovisual but not do an emotion 
induction, or for the terror-fear condition that asked participants to watch the audiovisual and then 
asked them to express a different emotion. This combination of findings suggests to us that anger 
is therefore the more likely driver for the pattern we see, but as we note, the cleanest comparison 
is between the terror-anger and terror-fear conditions. 
15 As noted earlier, the lack of a significant difference may be due to feelings of anger being more 
prominent when people are exposed to news about terrorism, even in the absence of an emotion 
induction. There was not space on the instrument to test this intuition. 
16 Tendencies toward risk acceptance are relevant to the study of threat. To evaluate if risk orien-
tations moderate our results, we interacted our treatment variables with two pre-treatment indica-
tors of risk acceptance (see Appendix F.2). We do not find sufficient evidence to conclude that risk 
acceptance significantly conditions our conclusions. 
